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Abstract  
 
R&D and innovation are critical factors to succeed. Nevertheless, they generate information 
asymmetries between corporate insiders and external investors. Within the context of an IPO, 
information asymmetries increase the risk of underpricing. In this paper, we claim that the 
patent commercialization strategy of the firm going public affects information asymmetries 
and IPO underpricing. In particular, underpricing will be higher when a firm’s patent 
commercialization strategy is more based on licenses. A firm’s stock of patent attenuates this 
effect. Our results on a sample of 130 IPOs in the US semiconductor industry confirm these 
predictions.  
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Patent Commercialization Strategy and IPO Underpricing: Evidence from 
the US Semiconductor Industry 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
R&D and innovation are critical factors to succeed in high-tech industries. Nevertheless, the 
inherent uncertainty on the economic returns to innovation leads to substantial information 
asymmetries between corporate insiders and external investors (Aboody & Lev, 2000). 
Therefore, on one hand innovation contributes to firm value by boosting expected economic 
performance, while on the other hand it can reduce firm valuation by external investors due 
to potential adverse selection arising from information asymmetries. Although several 
studies have shown a positive valuation of patents and R&D investments by the stock 
markets (e.g., Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005; Hall & Oriani, 2006), other authors have 
advanced that more R&D intensive firms are systematically undervalued (e.g., Chan, 
Lakonishok, & Sougiannis, 2001; Eberhart, Maxwell, & Siddique, 2004).  
Information asymmetries represent a problem especially for the funding of younger and 
R&D-intensive firms operating in high tech industries, for which external investors have less 
information available, often creating serious financing constraints (e.g., Guiso, 1998; 
Carpenter & Petersen, 2002). A critical step in the financing of these firms is the Initial 
Public Offer (IPO), which potentially allows them raise new funds through the issue of new 
shares acquired by external investors. The proceedings from the share issue can be allocated 
to finance innovation and growth. However, within the context of an IPO, the presence of 
information asymmetries may result in a higher risk of underpricing for the firm going public 
(e.g., Guo, Lev, & Shi, 2006). Underpricing is usually defined as the difference (if positive) 
between the closing price of the stock at the end of the first day of trading and the initial 
offer price divided by the offer price (i.e., the stock return of the first trading day). It 
represents money left on table by the firm and pre-IPO shareholders, involving a transfer of 
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wealth from pre-IPO shareholders to first-day investors (Certo, Covin, Daily, & Dalton, 
2001).    
In order to reduce information asymmetries and mitigate underpricing, firms going public 
may disclose information to signal their quality (Certo, 2003). Existing studies have 
demonstrated, for example, that IPO performance is affected, among others, by underwriter 
prestige (e.g., Carter, Dark, & Singh, 1998), venture capital backing (e.g., Megginson & 
Weiss, 1991), the presence of one or more founders (Nelson, 2003), board composition 
(Filatotchev and Bishop, 2004), top management team legitimacy (Cohen & Dean, 2005) and 
the level of CEO equity (Certo, Daily, Cannella, & Dalton, 2003).     
For more R&D-intensive firms, however, the effect of signaling is more controversial, as they 
are characterized by higher information asymmetries. In this respect, patents have been 
considered a valid signal of the quality of a firm’s innovation activities (Long, 2002; Hsu & 
Ziedonis, 2008). Some recent studies have focused on the relationship between patent-based 
measures and the pricing of IPOs. Specifically, Chin, Lee, Kleinman, and Chen (2006) have 
found a positive association between number of patents and IPO performance. Heeley, 
Matusik and Jain (2007) have documented how the number of patents significantly reduces 
IPO underpricing, but only in the industries characterized by stronger appropriability regimes.  
The previous papers, however, have not considered the importance of firm-specific innovation 
strategies within the IPO context. As Certo and colleagues (2009: 1359) have pointed out in a 
recent review on IPO research, “… scholars should direct their attention to uncovering how 
and why some firms are able to convert such investments into gains at IPO, whereas others 
are not”. Indeed, although in high-tech industries patents represent fundamental assets, firms 
generally adopt different strategies to exploit and commercialize them. In the specific case of 
the semiconductor industry, for example, Hall and Ziedonis (2001) showed that patents play a 
multifaceted role: large-scale manufacturers use patents as legal rights to exclude other 
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producers, whereas specialized design firms use them as a signal to attract the interest of 
downstream manufacturers and financial investors.  
Thus, IPO underpricing might not be influenced only by the possession of patents, but also by 
the strategic use which is made of them to create and capture value, i.e. patent 
commercialization strategy. We refer in particular to two different patent commercialization 
strategies (Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Linden & Somaya, 2003; Ahuja & Lahiri, 2006; Fosfuri, 
2006): a) licensing-based strategies adopted by firms focusing on the development of patented 
technologies which are then licensed to external partners; b) integrated strategies, adopted by 
firms which exploit patents within the development, manufacturing and commercialization of 
new products. 
While previous research has addressed the determinants of  the choice of a commercialization 
strategy based on licensing (e.g., Gans & Stern, 2003; Arora & Merges, 2004; Fosfuri, 2006; 
Kasch & Dowling, 2008), to our knowledge no previous work has studied the relationship 
between the choice of a particular patent commercialization strategy and the access to external 
financing. With specific reference to IPOs, moreover, no previous attempt has been made to 
analyze whether the choice of a given commercialization strategy impacts on the degree of 
information asymmetries between the issuer and the investors, and by that on the level of IPO 
underpricing. 
 In order to complement previous literature, we intend, therefore, to analyze the two following 
research questions: i) How does the choice of a given patent commercialization strategy affect 
IPO undepricing?; ii) Does a firm’s patent stock moderate the effect of the patent 
commercialization strategy on IPO underpricing?. We will analyze these research questions 
in the semiconductor industry, on a sample of 130 firms that went public in the United States 
in the period 1996-2007. The semiconductor industry represents an ideal setting to test our 
hypotheses given the surge in the number of patents and the presence of firms with different 
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commercialization strategies (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). In order to analyze the patent 
commercialization strategies, we relied on the information about the revenues generated by 
patent licensing activities reported in the IPO prospectus.
2
 Our empirical analysis provides 
two main results. First, we show that when firms rely more on licensing-based patent 
commercialization strategies, the underpricing at their IPO is higher. Moreover, a firm’s stock 
of patents can reduce underpricing when the patent commercialization strategy is more based 
on licenses. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present our theoretical 
background and our research hypotheses. In Section 3 we introduce our empirical setting, the 
semiconductor industry, whereas in Section 4 we describe the sample and the calculation of 
variables. Section 5 reports the results of the descriptive and multivariate analyses. In the final 
section we draw our conclusions from the theoretical and empirical analyses.   
 
 
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1 Innovation and information asymmetries 
R&D investments generate information asymmetries between insiders and external investors, 
since they are highly idiosyncratic and have very uncertain results. These information 
asymmetries can hinder the financing of innovation (Hall, 2002). In fact, as external investors 
have not the same knowledge of the innovation projects as the insiders, a problem of adverse 
selection arises. In response, external investors are not available to fund firm’s R&D projects, 
or they fund them only if the expected rate of return (i.e., the cost of capital for the firm) is 
high enough. In smaller and younger R&D-intensive firms with no track record on previous 
activities, information asymmetries are even more important and they can create strong 
                                               
2
 It should be noted that IPO prospectuses have a standard structure. In particular, Regulation S-K describes the 
structure of these documents and provides a format that companies are required to follow when creating a 
prospectus.  
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financing constraints due the absence of potential investors or to a too high cost of capital 
imposed on external sources of financing (e.g., Himmelberg & Petersen, 1994; Guiso, 1998; 
Carpenter & Petersen, 2002).  
Patents can be important to reduce information asymmetries for R&D-intensive firms for 
several reasons. First, by their nature, they disclose information about the technologies 
developed and available to the firm. Second, as patents are granted after a thorough 
examination process by a national patent office, they are a signal of the quality of the 
invention. Third, they make the firm more attractive to those external investors, above all 
venture capitalists, that have a specific knowledge of the industry technological background.  
Empirical studies support this view for both younger entrepreneurial and more mature traded 
firms. The analysis of Mann and Sager (2007) on the software industry documents a positive 
and significant correlation between patenting and the firm’s progress through the venture 
capital cycle. Similarly, Hsu and Ziedonis (2008), analyzing 370 semiconductor startups that 
received more than 800 rounds of VC funding from 1980 through 2005, found a statistically 
significant and economically large effect of patent filings on investor estimates of start-up 
value. In the semiconductor industry, the field interviews conducted by Hall and Ziedonis 
(2001: 110) on the use and importance of patents show that patents are “… an imperfect, but 
quantifiable measure of technology that enabled technology-based trades to be made in 
external markets, both in financial markets (venture capital) and with suppliers and owners of 
complementary technologies”. The empirical analysis of Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005) on 
a broad sample of US traded firms shows that in a firm market value model patent data add 
information to the R&D investments, as demonstrated by the positive and significant 
coefficients. This implies that stock market investors recognize the value of patents. In the 
same vein, Deng, Lev and Narin (1999) find a significant relationship between patents and 
stock returns.  
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In the specific case of firms going-public, therefore, patents could be important for reducing 
the level of information asymmetries involved in the IPO. However, in this paper we advance 
that their role depends on the patent commercialization strategy adopted by the firm going 
public.  
 
   
2.2  Patent commercialization strategy and IPO underpricing  
A well known pattern associated with the process of going public is the ‘underpricing’, as 
measured by the high initial returns of an IPO which occur when the share offer price is below 
the closing price at the end of the first day of trading. The empirical regularity of IPO 
underpricing has motivated a large theoretical literature trying to explain its causes (see Ritter 
and Welch, 2002, for a review of the empirical evidence). The most established explanation 
for underpricing resides in the model based on information asymmetries, which assumes that 
firms and underwriters will discount the initial offer price in order to induce external investors 
to buy stock in absence of full information on firm’s value (Rock 1986). In particular, the 
initial underpricing should increase with the ex ante uncertainty about the value of the IPO 
firm (Ritter, 1984, Beatty & Ritter, 1986).  
As explained in the previous section, the economic attributes of innovation lead to higher 
information asymmetries between corporate insiders and external investors, increasing 
therefore the risk of potential underpricing at the IPO. For instance, in a study of 1431 IPOs 
in the United States, Heeley and colleagues (2007) found that firms investing more in R&D 
experienced higher underpricing. In a similar vein, Guo and colleagues (2006) showed that, on 
a sample of 2,696 US IPOs issued during 1980–1995, the R&D activities of issuers 
significantly affected both the initial underpricing of IPOs and their long-term performance. 
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Previous research has shown that patents can play a role in this context (Heeley et al., 2007), 
but we claim that information asymmetries are affected as well by the specific patent 
commercialization strategy a firm will decide to adopt. In a seminal article, Teece (1986) has 
discussed how firms can choose different governance modes in order to translate innovation 
into economic returns. They can either directly invest to develop and control the 
complementary assets required to bring the innovation into the market, cooperate with other 
companies to access their complementary assets, or sell the technology. Cooperation can take 
various forms, ranging from equity-based cooperation or joint ventures, strategic alliances or 
patent licensing agreements.  
We explicitly focus on a firm’s decision to license patents to one or more buyers, referring to 
firms adopting licensing-based patent commercialization strategies. The increasing interest for 
this type of commercialization strategy in a wide variety of industries is a consequence of the 
rapid diffusion of the “markets for technologies” (Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001). 
Although markets for technologies are not a new phenomenon (Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, 
1998), they have grown rapidly over the last two decades as a consequence of the increasing 
complexity of technology and the amount of resources required to come out with innovations. 
A new division of innovative labor is therefore taking place in several industries, such as 
chemical engineering, semiconductors and electronics, software, biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical (e.g., Arora et al., 2001), whereby specialist firms focus on the development 
of new scientific and technological knowledge, protect it with patents and other IPRs and then 
license them in the downstream market
3
.  
                                               
3
 Several biotechnology entrants over the period going from the mid 80s to the late 90s rather than aspiring to 
become fully integrated pharmaceutical companies, chose to focus their effort on research and to collaborate 
with established pharmaceutical companies on development and commercialization (Pisano, 2006). In the 
semiconductor industry, so-called fabless companies which chose to license their technology rather than 
engaging in capital-intensive downstream applications have grown rapidly over the years (Hall & Ziedonis, 
2001). In the chemical engineering sector, since the early ‘50s specialist producers of engineering and 
technology knowledge served downstream firms through licensing transactions (Arora, 1997). In the case of 
nanotechnology (Munari & Toschi, 2009), several new start-ups adopt business model based on licensing to 
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We argue that firms relying more on a licensing-based patent commercialization strategy will 
be characterized by higher information asymmetries and, as a consequence, by a higher 
underpricing, for at least two different reasons. First, firms adopting a licensing-based 
commercialization are more intangibles-intensive than other firms (their main resources being 
R&D, patents, other IPRs, alliances, human and social capital) and they possess negligible 
physical assets (Lev, 2008). This is likely to pose significant valuation problems by financial 
analysts and create higher information asymmetries between corporate insiders and external 
investors. Several studies have demonstrated that for intangible-intensive firms analyst 
coverage is significantly wider (Barth, Kasznik, & McNichols, 2001), but analysts’ forecasts 
present larger errors (Gu & Wang, 2005) and higher variance (Barron, Byard, Kile, & Riedl, 
2002). Moreover, financial reports provide less useful information to external investors on 
intangible assets than on tangible assets (Guo, Lev, & Zhou, 2005), thus exacerbating the 
information asymmetries between corporate insiders and external investors when a firm is 
more based on intangible assets.  
Second, a licensing-based commercialization strategy involves higher contractual hazards 
(Teece, 1986). In fact, the difficulty to define ex-ante all the detailed specifications for the 
licensing agreements may lead to incomplete contracts and higher risks of opportunistic 
behavior by the counterpart.
4
 Being highly specific to the licensing contracts, these risks 
generate higher information asymmetries between corporate insiders, better informed about 
the contracts, and external investors.  
                                                                                                                                                  
exploit their patented inventions in a wide variety of application contexts, given the characteristics of general-
purpose technology of this emerging field. 
4
 A typical risk is that the licensor, through the upstream integration into R&D, becomes a direct competitor. 
Teece (2000) reports the historical example of the RCA colour television to illustrate the risks involved in a pure 
licensing strategy. When RCA developed colour television, it decided to license its proprietary technology 
aggressively and outsource the manufacturing of the key components of the television itself. Its licensees, in 
particular those from Japan, subsequently integrated downstream and upstream, becoming producers of whole 
TV sets, ultimately leading RCA out of the market. 
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In summary, our two explanations, based on the difficult valuation of intangible assets and the 
imperfections of licensing contracts, support the expectation of higher information 
asymmetries at the moment of IPO between a corporate insiders and external investors when 
the firm adopts a licensing-based patent commercialization strategy. This should result in the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1. IPO underpricing will be higher for those firms relying more on a licensing-
based patent commercialization strategy  
 
 
2.3. IPO underpricing and patents  
Some recent studies have focused on different innovation measures as proxies of ex ante 
uncertainty about the value of the firm going public. In particular, Guo and colleagues (2004, 
2006) have documented a positive relation between R&D intensity and underpricing, thus 
singling out R&D as a major contributor to information asymmetries.  
Other studies have examined patent-related measures as a signal of firm’s value. Chin and 
colleagues (2006) have analyzed a cross-sectional sample of 623 Taiwanese IPO firms and 
found that official monthly reports of newly developed patents released to the public and the 
frequency of patent citations significantly increased IPO underpricing. They concluded that, 
because of high uncertain value of patents, greater level of innovation capital lead to greater 
uncertainty in firm’s value. Bessler and Bittelmeyer (2008) investigated the relation between 
innovation and performance for a sample of German firms that went public at the “Neuer 
Markt” during the period from 1997 to 2002. The authors found that mean underpricing for 
IPOs with patents was lower relative to the group of IPOs without patents in hot issue periods, 
but in contrast it was higher in cold issue markets. However, these results are far to be 
conclusive as they are based on descriptive statistics and not tested with multivariate analyses. 
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Finally, Heeley and colleagues (2007) conducted a cross-sectional study on a sample of 1,413 
US firms conducting initial public offerings in the period 1981–98. They showed that patents 
have the potential to convey interpretable information to investors about the value of 
innovation, but only when there is a stronger relationship between patents and firm 
performance. They proved that patents reduce information asymmetries (i.e., underpricing) in 
industries with a stronger appropriability regime, while they generate higher underpricing in 
industries with a weaker appropriability regime.  
However, none of these studies has considered that the effect of patents on underpricing may 
depend on the firm-specific patent commercialization strategy. In particular, a firm’s stock of 
patents is more effective to mitigate information asymmetries when not only the industry-
specific approriability regime, but also the firm-specific patent commercialization strategy 
involves a clearer link between patents and expected performance. Within an integrated 
commercialization strategy, patents create value only indirectly, through the products that will 
be sold on the market. Firm’s ability to effectively use patents depends on firm-specific, 
complex and idiosyncratic combinations of the patents with other resources and 
complementary assets (Teece, 1986; Miller, 1993; Certo et al., 2009). External investors will 
be less informed than corporate insiders about these combinations, so that patents will be less 
useful signal on firm quality.        
Conversely, the adoption of a licensing-based patent commercialization strategy requires a 
direct exploitation of the patents owned, as firm’s revenues mainly come from the licenses of 
these patents. Patents are the core assets for the firm and are used in isolation within licensing 
agreements to generate revenues. For firms adopting a licensing-based commercialization 
strategy, the possession of patents is then a critical condition to predict firm performance. 
Therefore, when the commercialization strategy is more based on licensing, patents become 
an extremely important quality signal for external investors (Hall & Ziedonis, 2001). 
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Accordingly, we advance the following:       
 
Hypothesis 2. A firm’s patent stock negatively moderates the relationship between patent 
commercialization strategy and IPO underpricing.  
 
 
3. EMPIRICAL SETTING: THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 
The empirical setting we analyze is represented by the semiconductor industry in the United 
States. It represents an ideal context to study the effects of patent commercialization strategies 
on IPO underpricing for several reasons. First, since its inception, this industry has been 
characterized by a rapid pace of technological change and high levels of R&D investments. 
Second, there is a widespread recourse to patenting by semiconductor firms. Hall and 
Ziedonis (2001) show that the number of semiconductor-related patents in the United States 
has risen sharply since the early 1980, well above the overall increase in patenting. They refer 
to a “patent paradox”, stemming from the gap between the observed increase in patenting and 
the relative ineffectiveness of patents as a mechanism to appropriate the returns from 
innovation, as reported in innovation surveys. Indeed, the Yale and Carnegie-Mellon surveys 
on appropriability conditions (Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, & Winter, 1987; Cohen, Nelson, & 
Walsh, 2000), administered to R&D managers of US manufacturing firms respectively in 
1983 and 1994, showed that patents were rated as a weak instrument to protect innovative 
results in the semiconductor industry. Hall and Ziedonis (2001) explain this paradox in large 
part in terms of the strategic use of patents which has consolidated in the industry, based on 
the accumulation of vast patent portfolios to be used by firms as “bargaining chips” in order 
to obtain the required freedom to operate.5 
                                               
5 In cumulative technology fields as semiconductors and electronics, indeed, it is likely that a firm, in order to 
compete with advanced product and processes, has to use also the technology of other companies. Overlapping 
developments are therefore very frequent, as well as the risks to achieve positions of mutually blocking patents. 
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The third and more compelling reason to choose the semiconductor industry as our research 
setting resides in the significant vertical specialization of design and manufacturing activities 
which characterizes the industry, resulting in the formation of specialized design firms and 
specialized manufacturing firms over the last thirty years. Whereas until the ‘80s large firms 
operating in the semiconductor industry, such as IBM, DEC, AT&T and Motorola, were 
highly integrated, that decade showed the emergence of specialized design firms, also known 
as “fabless” companies. Such companies typically do not have in-house fabrication plants or 
manufacturing setups, but solely concentrate on research, design and development of 
semiconductor chips. The benefits associated with the fabless model mainly reside in the 
elimination of the huge capital investment associated with building and operating a new fab, 
and on the possibility to focus on core competencies in research and design activities, thus 
accelerating the development process.  
The industry thus experienced the emergence of two different patent commercialization 
strategies: integrated and licensing-based ones (Linden & Somaya, 2003).6 Firms adopting an 
integrated commercialization strategy own and control all the required resources for 
semiconductor manufacturing and commercialization: design, process technology, fabrication 
and assembly equipment, test equipment, distribution facilities. The firms adopting a 
licensing-based strategy are specialized design firms, possessing innovative technologies and 
exclusive intellectual property, and earning revenues solely from licensing, or from products, 
or a combination of the two. These firms typically outsource the fabrication of the devices to a 
specialized semiconductor manufacturer. Whereas IBM, Motorola and Samsung are well-
known examples of companies adopting an integrated strategy, ARM, Qualcomm and 
                                                                                                                                                  
The need to achieve freedom to operate in design and manufacturing thus naturally resulted in patent cross-
licensing agreements, which generally involve the mutual exchange of portfolios of all current and future patents 
in a given field-of-use (Grindley & Teece, 2000). 
6
 Linden and Somaya (2003) introduce a further distinction with reference to component-modes, adopted by 
those independent component manufacturers specialized in the production of components to be sold to integrated 
companies for assembly. 
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Broadcom can be taken as examples of firms adopting a licensing-based patent 
commercialization strategy.7  
Given that the number of firms embracing the licensing-based commercialization strategy in 
the semiconductor industry has increased significantly over the course of the last thirty years 
(Macher, Mowery, & Simcoe, 2002; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001), this setting provides and ideal 
setting to study our research question. 
 
 
4.  DATA AND METHODS 
4.1 Sample and data sources 
Our analyses are based on a final sample of 130 companies that went public in the United 
States in the semiconductor industry in the period 1996-2007. Table 1 shows the distribution 
over time of the firms going public included in our sample. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here  
------------------------------ 
 
The initial sample of semiconductor firms (SIC code 3674) was obtained from Securities 
Data Corporation (SDC) database, New Issues. Our sample period begins in January 1996 
because IPO prospectuses are available on SEC Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and 
Retrieval (EDGAR) service only from that date. The initial sample consisted of 178 
semiconductor firms that have an IPO prospectus.  We first excluded 20 firms without price 
and accounting data available from Worldscope and Datastream. We lost additional 28 firms 
due to missing information on the final IPO offer price required for the calculation of 
underpricing, reducing the final sample size to 130 firms.  
                                               
7
 For example, ARM (Advanced RISC Machines) is a very effective example of licensing-based firm (Davis, 
2008). Founded by twelve Cambridge engineers in 1990, it invented the RISC chip. It calls itself a purely 
intellectual property licensing company: instead of bearing the costs associated with manufacturing, it licenses 
its proprietary technology to semiconductor manufacturers and OEMs. By the end of 2008, more than 200 
leading semiconductor companies had licensed more than 580 ARM technology designs. 
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We collected the IPO prospectuses for all these firms from the SEC database. Since the IPO 
prospectus is the primary sources of information on newly issued stocks, we used such source 
in order to define a firm’s patent commercialization strategy (integrated vs. licensing-based), 
analyzing the information reported in the document. From the Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) database we obtained financial information on the IPO. Financial statement 
information (assets, debt, revenues, earnings, shareholder’s equity, R&D expenses) were 
obtained from Worldscope and Datastream. In particular, from the last financial statement 
reported in the IPO prospectus we manually collected the information on the amount of 
revenues arising from licensing. Ritter’s data set (Loughran & Ritter, 2004) provided 
company founding dates and underwriters’ reputation rankings. From Delphion database we 
retrieved data on patents filed at the USPTO by each firm in the 5 years before the IPO, as 
done in the paper by Heeley et al. (2007). Finally, measures of disclosure on licensing 
activities were derived from content analysis of the IPO prospectus. 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Variable Definition  
Dependent variable. In our regression analyses, we used Underpricing (UP) as dependent 
variable. It measures the percent change in the stock price during the first day of trading. It is 
calculated as follows: 
  
! 
P
1
 -  P
0
 
P
0  
where P1 is the closing price at the end of first day of trading of the IPO and P0 is the offer 
price of the IPO.  
Independent variables. In order to define a measure for the patent commercialization strategy, 
for each firm we created a variable Licensing-based strategy calculated as the ratio between a 
firm’s revenues from licenses and total revenues, as reported in the last financial statement 
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before the IPO. This is a continuous variable ranging from 0 and 1and measuring to which 
degree a firms relies on licensing-based patent commercialization strategy to capture the value 
of its innovation.8 
In order to test Hypothesis 2, we followed Heeley and colleagues (2007) and created a 
variable Patent stock, measuring the total number of USPTO patents filed by the company in 
the 5 years before the IPO.  There are two main reasons to adopt a five-year window before 
the IPO to construct such measure (Heeley et al., 2007).  First, recent patents provide the most 
updated information about firm inventive capabilities at the time of IPO. Second, although in 
theory patent protection lasts for 20 years from the date of filing, previous research has shown 
that patents tend to be exploited in a relatively short protection period, after which they loose 
most of their economic value. 
Control variables.  In our regression analyses, we included a set of control variables that have 
been associated with underpricing by previous studies (see Ljungqvist, 2005, for a review). 
We include a measure of underwriter reputation to account for the effects of hiring a highly 
reputed lead underwriter on underpricing. Previous studies (e.g., Loughran & Ritter, 2004) 
have shown that since the 1990s prestigious underwriters have been associated with higher 
underpricing. We include a dummy variable (Prestigious underwriter) taking the value one if 
the underwriter reputation ranking proposed by Loughran and Ritter (2004) is equal to or 
greater to 8.00, and zero otherwise. In Loghran and Ritter’s scale, a reputation ranking of 8.00 
or higher indicates a top-tier underwriter, whereas a value less than 8.00 is associated with 
regional underwriters or small IPOs (“penny stocks”). We control for the retention of shares 
by insider shareholders (Insider shareholder) that measures the proportion of total shares 
                                               
8
 In order to validate such measure, we then created an additional variable – Licensing words - computed by 
counting the total number of words related to licensing disclosed in the IPO prospectus. We considered the 
following words to create such variable: “license-s/d”, “licensing”, “licensor”, “royalty”, “royalties”, 
“sublicense-s/d”, “sublicensing”, “sublicensor”.  Our analyses show a significant correlations between the two 
variables Licensing-based Licensing Words (0.5024 significant at 1% level), thus confirming the robustness of 
our measure. 
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outstanding after the IPO retained by insiders shareholders. According to signalling theory 
(see Daily, Certo, Dalton & Roengpitya, 2003, for a review), the retention of shares by insider 
shareholders makes investors more confident about the long-term prospects of the firm. We 
include a dummy variable (VCbacked) taking the value of one if a company received venture-
capital backing before the IPO, and zero otherwise. Previous studies provided opposite 
conclusions on the relation between venture capital and IPO underpricing. Some of them (e.g. 
Megginson & Weiss, 1991) supported a monitoring and certification role of venture capital 
that decreases IPO underpricing. Other studies (e.g. Brav & Gompers 2003) proved that 
venture-backed companies experience more underpricing at the IPO. We control for the firm’s 
age at the IPO including the variable (logAge) calculated on the basis of the IPO year and the 
company’s founding year (Ritter 2004). In the empirical model we uses the log-
transformation of this variable to account for its high skewness. According to IPO literature 
(e.g. Ritter, 1984, 1998), the age affects the information availability on the firm and reduces 
the level of uncertainty in case of older and more established firms. This reduction of 
information asymmetry implies that there is a negative relation between firm age and IPO 
underpricing. We include a measure of firms’ R&D investments (R&D intensity) that we 
calculated as R&D expenditures scaled by sales as reported in the last financial statement year 
just prior to the IPO. Firms investing more in R&D generally experience higher undepricing 
(Guo et al., 2006; Heeley et al. 2007). To account for the effect of other firms’ characteristics, 
we include different financial variables calculated for the last financial statement year just 
prior to the IPO. Firms’ leverage (Leverage) measures the company’s total debt scaled by 
total assets. Previous studies (e.g. Kim, Pukthuanthong-Le & Walker, 2008) claimed that debt 
serves as a signal of better firm quality, since managers of highly leveraged firms face tougher 
budget constraints and have less control over the firm’s cash flows. This increases 
transparency and reduces the severity of agency conflicts between managers and outside 
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investors. In the absence of a history of profits, Bartov, Mohanram and Seethamraju (2002) 
have suggested that investors rely on revenue as an important financial value driver of IPO 
firms. We control for the firm’s profitability including a measure of firm’s total revenues 
earned just prior to the IPO (Revenues) and a dummy variable (Loss) taking the value of one if 
a firm reports negative net income in the last financial statement prior to the IPO year, and the 
value of zero otherwise. Finally, we added a full set of year dummies to check for time-
specific trends in the stock market. 
 
 
4.3 Methods  
In order to analyze whether the choice of a given patent commercialization strategy impacts 
on the degree of information asymmetries between the issuer and the investors, our empirical 
analyses estimate the impact of the licensing-based commercialization strategy on IPO 
underpricing. 
In particular, to test Hypothesis 1, we first estimated the following OLS regression model: 
 
  
! 
UPi =  a0 + a1 licensing" based strategyi + a2 patents stocki + a3 control variables + ei  
(1) 
 
where UPi is the underpricing at the IPO, Licensing-based Strategy indicates the firm’s patent 
commercialization strategy and measures the share of firm’s total revenues arising from 
licenses. Patents stock is total number of USPTO patents filed in the 5 years before the IPO. 
The control variables included in Eq. (1) are those described in the previous section. The 
hypothesis that a patent commercialization strategy based on licensing increases the 
information asymmetries at the moment of IPO between corporate insiders and external 
investors, and thereby underpricing, suggests that the coefficient of Licensing-based strategy 
is greater than zero (a1 > 0). 
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In order to understand whether a firm’s patent stock moderates the effect of the patent 
commercialization strategy on IPO underpricing (Hypothesis 2), we then estimated a second 
model in which we introduced an interaction term between Patent Stock and Licensing-based 
Strategy. More precisely, we estimated the following OLS equation: 
 
 
 (2) 
 
The hypothesis that patents represent a positive signal for investors when firm’s 
commercialization strategy is more based on licensing, thus reducing underpricing, implies 
that the coefficient on the interaction between Patent Stock and Licensing-based Strategy is 
lower than zero (b3 < 0). 
 
 
5. ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample of IPO firms.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table  2 about here  
------------------------------ 
 
Average IPO underpricing in the full sample is 18%, a value in line with results provided by 
previous studies. For example, in a survey of IPO activity in the U.S. over the period 1980-
2001, based on a sample of 6249 IPOs from various samples, Ritter and Welch (2002) report 
an average underpricing of 18.8%.9 Considering patent commercialization strategies, 20% of 
                                               
9
 The study of Heeley et al. (2007) reports slightly lower average levels of first-day stock returns (11.65%). 
However, it is a based on a sample of IPOs from the period 1981-1998, thus excluding the “hot market” period 
1999-2000, characterized by very high values of underpricing due to the Internet bubble. 
 
  
! 
UPi =  b0 + b1 licensing" based strategyi + b2 patents stocki + b3 patents stocki *  licensing" based strategy +
          +  b4control variables + ei
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the companies (26 companies out of 130) included in our sample report positive revenues 
from licenses. The average value of Licensing-based Strategy is therefore quite limited, 
around 5%. For some companies included in our sample, such variable takes the value 1, as 
they adopt pure-licensing commercialization strategies, generating revenues only through 
licensing transactions. On average, the firms in the sample filed 31 USPTO patents in the five 
years preceding the IPO. Moreover, Table 2 shows that the majority of our sample is 
composed by venture-backed companies (66%) and by firms with a prestigious underwriter 
(80%). Considering accounting data, 50% of the sample reports negative income in the last 
financial statement prior the IPO and the average revenues are equal to 137 million of dollars. 
The average R&D intensity is 4.26 and the average leverage ratio is 0.28. 
In Table 3 we report the correlation matrix. None of the correlation coefficients raise serious 
problems of multicollinearity. Standard test demonstrate that correlations among independent 
variables are not worrisome since individual (average) variance inflation factors are below the 
conventional level of 10 (6) and condition numbers are close to 1.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here  
------------------------------ 
 
 
5.2 Regression Results  
Table 4 shows the results of our regression analyses. We started by estimating Equation (1) 
through standard OLS, in order to test Hypothesis 1 and investigate the relation of IPO 
underpricing and licensing-based commercialization strategy.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here  
------------------------------ 
 
 
We find that the adoption of a patent commercialization strategy more focused on licensing 
significantly increases IPO underpricing. Indeed, the coefficient of the variable Licensing-
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based Strategy is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This result confirms 
Hypothesis 1 and suggests that the degree of information asymmetry with external investors is 
positively related to the adoption of a commercialization strategy mainly based on licensing. 
Looking at the relation between IPO underpricing and the stock of patents held by the firm, 
we find that the coefficient of Patent Stock is positive, but not statistically significant at 
conventional levels in Model 1. This finding is in line with the expectations that patent stock 
represents an important signal for investors only when it is accounted for the firm’s 
commercialization strategy that is the strategic use that is made of them to create and capture 
value.  
As regards control variables, we find a positive and statistically significant (at 1% level) effect 
of Prestigious Underwriter on IPO underpricing. This result is in line with Loughran and 
Ritter’s  (2004) findings demonstrating that prestigious underwriters underprice more firms 
going public. Conversely, the variables Loss firms and Insider shareholders are negative and 
statistically significantly (respectively, at 5% and 10% level), thus reducing the level of IPO 
underpricing. Thus, firm’s profitability and the retention of shares by insider shareholders 
represent positive signals of firm’s quality thereby reducing the ex-ante uncertainty on firm’s 
value and information asymmetries. Although the effects of other control variables are not 
significant, their signs are aligned with the expectations.  
In order to test Hypothesis 2 and understand whether patent stock moderates the effect of 
patent commercialization strategy on IPO underpricing, in Column 2 we provide estimates 
from Equation 2, including an interaction term between Licensing-based Strategy and Patent 
Stock. We still find that a licensing-based strategy significantly (at 5% level) increases IPO 
underpricing and the degree of information asymmetry. On the other hand, the main effect of 
Patent Stock is now positive and statistically significant, at the 5% level. In line with the 
results provided by Heeley et al. (2007), this suggests that, within a context characterized by a 
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weaker appropriability regime, such as the semiconductor industry, patents increase the level 
of underpricing.  
However, consistently with Hypothesis 2, the coefficient of the interaction between Patent 
Stock and Licensing-based Strategy is positive and significant at 5% level. This result 
supports the hypothesis that patents represent positive quality signals for investors when a 
firm’s commercialization strategy is more based on licensing. The effects of the other control 
variables on underprincing are similar to those described for Model 1. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have analyzed whether patent commercialization strategy affects IPO 
underpricing. Whereas the existing literature has provided interesting results on the relation 
between patents and underpricing (Chin et al., 2006; Heeley et al., 2007), it has not 
considered that the firm-specific strategy adopted to exploit patents may also be an important 
determinant of information and by that of underpricing at IPO.  
Focusing on the semiconductor industry, where it is possible to identify two distinct types of 
patent commercialization strategy (licensing-based vs. integrated), we have shown that the 
decision to adopt a licensing-based strategy increases underpricing at the moment of the IPO. 
This is due to the greater uncertainty on the value of the firms adopting this strategy, which 
increases information asymmetries. In fact, firms adopting this strategy have more intangible 
assets, whose value is more difficult to assess for external investors, and their performance is 
more affected by contractual hazards, on which insiders have better information than external 
investors. 
Our result shed new light on a relevant topic, which is the effect of patent commercialization 
strategies on firm value. We advance that not only patents are important, but also the way 
they are used and combined within a firm’s strategy. This poses a new attention on the 
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heterogeneity of firms’ patent strategies and their relevance in explaining IPO underpricing. 
New evidence using measures at the firm-level could be important to investigate more in 
depth this issue. 
The results presented in the paper have also potential important implications. First, not only 
patents, but also patent commercialization strategies matter in the financing of innovation of 
firms in high tech industries. This result is in line with the findings of O’ Brien (2003), which 
show that a firm’s innovation strategy may affect its financing decisions. As concerns 
specifically the access to public equity markets through an IPO, our results suggest that firms 
adopting a commercialization strategy more based on licensing may encounter greater 
difficulties in raising new financial resources.    
Moreover, the fact that licensing-based firms suffer from a higher underpricing could have 
several consequences for the share pricing strategies and the timing of the IPO. To avoid 
strong discount, these firms could delay the moment of the IPO and should disclose more 
information to potential investors concerning their intangible assets and the use they intend to 
make of them. In addition, managers should be aware that patents are important signal on the 
quality of the firm to external investors when a firm’s revenues mainly come from licenses. In 
this way, the information asymmetries could be mitigated and the pricing could be more 
efficient, so that the money left of the table at the IPO could be reduced.   
Finally, we contribute to the literature on the strategic management of IPR. Reitzig and 
Puranam (2009) have argued that firm’s activities related to the generation, protection and 
utilization of IP are relevant for value creation and appropriation. Our results confirm that the 
protection and exploitation of IPRs are even more important for firms pursuing 
commercialization strategies based on licensing. For this kind of firms, it is therefore 
necessary to devote significant (both human and financial) resources to such activities, in 
order to mature distinctive capabilities in the strategic management of IPRs.   
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Finally, we have to acknowledge that at the present status the paper still presents several 
limitations. First, we did not assess how the specific characteristics of patent portfolios (i.e. 
quality, breadth, scientific strength) impact on underpricing. This is an interesting issue that 
deserves further development. Second, we did not analyze how the relevant information about 
patents and patent strategies flows from firms going public to investors. A more compelling 
analysis of disclosure behavior would be needed to shed more light on the relationship 
between patents and underpricing. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, we believe that our analysis is dealing with an innovative 
topic, namely the relationship between patent commercialization strategies, information 
asymmetries and underpricing, which may have important implications for both academics 
and practitioners.        
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
TABLE 1  
The Distribution of Companies by IPO Year 
IPO years No. Firms % of total sample 
1996 8 6 
1997 14 11 
1998 6 5 
1999 19 15 
2000 31 24 
2001 5 4 
2003 5 4 
2004 14 11 
2005 9 7 
2006 9 7 
2007 10 8 
Total 130 100 
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TABLE 2  
Descriptive Statistics  
Variables Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
      
Underpricing 130 0.18 0.30 -0.63 1.24 
Licensing-based strategy 130 0.05 0.15 0 1.00 
Licenses words 130 103.42 173.30 2 788 
Patents stock 130 30.90 57.94 0 308 
log(Age) 130 2.30 0.85 1 92 
VCbacked
a
 130 0.66 0.48 0 1 
R&D intensity 130 4.26 25.01 0 257.16 
Leverage 130 0.28 0.36 0 3.13 
Loss firms
a
 130 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Revenues 130 136.93 545.56 0 5660 
Prestigious underwriter
a
 130 0.81 0.40 0 1 
Insider shareholder 130 0.74 0.22 -0.99 0.99 
a)  Dummy variable. 
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TABLE 3  
Correlations Between Main Variables of Interest 
 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Underpricing  1          
2 Licensing based strategy  0.29*** 1         
3 Patents stock  0.08 0.14 1        
4 log(Age)  -0.07 -0.11 0.18** 1       
5 VCbacked  0.15* 0.06 -0.09 -0.17** 1      
6 R&D intensity  -0.24*** -0.05 -0.07 -0.04 -0.12 1     
7 Leverage  -0.22**    -0.07 -0.10 -0.02 -0.07 0.23*** 1    
8 Loss firms
 
 -0.12 0.09 -0.02 -0.30*** 0.07 0.13 0.08 1   
9 Revenues  -0.06 -0.07 0.37*** 0.23*** -0.23*** -0.03 0.06 -0.04 1  
10 Prestigious underwriter
 
 0.33*** 0.02 0.19**  -0.04 0.15* -0.30*** -0.18** 0.06 0.08 1 
11 Insider shareholder -0.15* -0.11 0.10 -0.04 0.08 -0.09 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.07 
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level in a two-tailed test 
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TABLE 4 
Regression Results
a 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 0.291 0.284 
 0.146** 0.144** 
Licensing based strategy 0.624 0.757 
 0.218*** 0.239*** 
Patent stock  0.000 0.001 
 0.000 0.000** 
Patent stock * Licensing based strategy -0.003 
  0.001** 
log(Age)  -0.020 -0.019 
 0.036 0.036 
VCbacked
b
  0.077 0.084 
 0.057 0.054 
R&D intensity -0.001 -0.001 
 0.001 0.001 
Leverage -0.104 -0.098 
 0.076 0.074 
Loss firms
 b
 -0.121 -0.127 
 0.051** 0.051** 
Revenues   0.000 0.000 
 0.000 0.000 
Prestigious underwriter
b 
  0.172 0.168 
 0.054*** 0.056*** 
Insider shareholder  -0.231 -0.231 
 0.121* 0.116** 
Year dummies yes yes 
N 130 130 
F-value 4.23*** 13.50*** 
R
2
 0.3748 0.3876 
a) Consistent standard errors are in italic. 
b) Dummy variable. 
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level in a two-tailed test 
 
 
 
      
 
 
